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REMOVING CORPORATE MONEY FROM POLITICS
More than one hundred years ago President Theodore Roosevelt started the
nation down a difficult path of campaign finance regulations when he sought a
legislative ban on corporate contributions made in relation to elections. 1 What
followed President Roosevelt’s plea were several regulations purposed toward
refining a campaign finance system to prevent disproportionate influence of
the wealthy, to regulate campaign spending, and to minimize abuses of the
system through public disclosures. 2 Over the next century, Congress would
pass multiple statutes in furtherance of these goals, and the Court would
subsequently restrict the congressional power to regulate these areas on First
Amendment grounds. This back and forth has created an intricate system of
campaign finance that is in dire need of restructuring. By passing the Tillman
Act, Congress made the first move banning direct corporate involvement in
federal elections. 3 This ban caused a century of litigation and regulation,
eventually ending in 2010 when the Supreme Court held such bans on
corporations were unconstitutional. 4 Regardless of whether the Constitution
protects the political speech of a corporation, it is obvious, due to the number
of regulations and amount of litigation, that corporate spending on elections is
highly controversial. The fear of corporate influence over elections, through
deep pockets holding large sums of money, may be well grounded; but,
because the Supreme Court has held the First Amendment protects a
corporation’s political speech there is no regulation Congress may pass
restricting this right. A possible solution to this problem would be to pass
legislation which proposes a trade to corporations; corporations agree not to
spend any money on elections in return for the ability to vote in elections.
Background of Campaign Finance Law Regulations on Corporations
The history of campaign finance is best described by Justice Brennan in his
opinion from Cort v. Ash that the purpose of the regulations was “to assure that

1 The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, February 2004,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated February 2017).
2 Id.
3 Adam Cohen, A Century-Old Principle: Keep Corporate Money out of Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/opinion/11tue4.html.
4 Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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federal elections are free from the power of money, to eliminate the apparent
hold on political parties which business interests. . . seek and sometimes obtain
by reason of liberal campaign contributions.” 5 The passage of the Tillman Act
of 1907 was first believed to be a strict ban on corporate involvement in
federal elections but due to loopholes 6 Congress passed the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1910 (FCPA) to require disclosures on all campaign
contribution sources as well as limited Party spending. 7 Because the FCPA
regulated spending by political parties, it was struck down by the Supreme
Court in Newberry v. United States on the grounds that the Congress was not
given the power to regulate parties this way by the Constitution. 8 The fear of
corporate involvement remained after this ruling and the Congress was forced
to amend the FCPA in 1925 to comply with the Court’s holding by continuing
the ban on corporate political contributions and disclosure but adding in a
system of campaign spending for Senate and House Candidates. 9 The
provisions of the amended FCPA were not stringent enough and loopholes
were exposed, 10 leading to more regulations on who could contribute to
political campaigns; 11 but, these regulations also fell short as the response to
direct bans was to create political action committees (PACs) to contribute on
the true donor’s behalf. 12
The next regulation on corporate spending on elections came with the TaftHartley Act of 1947 which made stricter regulations for corporations
contributing to candidates. 13 Campaign finance law remained almost
unchanged until the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), replacing the FCPA, which sought further disclosure requirements on
5 Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92
UCLA PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES. 871, 878 (2004) (citing Cort v. Ash 422 U.S. 66, 82
(1975)).
6 Beth Rowan, Campaign-Finance Regulation: History and Timeline: A Look at Early Campaign
Finance Legislation and Efforts to Regulate Fund Raising for Political Campaigns, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/us/history/campaign-finance-reform-timeline.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. (showing that required disclosures of contributions exceeding $50 to candidates; Congressional
candidate spending was limited to $.03 per voter from last election cycle with a cap at $25,000 for Senate
candidates and a cap at $5,000 for House candidates).
10 Id.
11 Id. The Public Utilities Holding Act of 1935 banned the involvement of public utility companies; the
Hatch Act of 1939 banned federal employees from contributing to campaigns; The Smith-Connelly Act of
1943 banned labor unions from direct contributions. Id.
12 Id. (stating that union members would create PACs that acted independently of the Union to influence
federal elections).
13 Id.
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campaign funding to bring the money into the light and restrict spending 14
while maintaining a ban on corporate contributions to candidates. This created
a strict law of campaign finance with maximum contribution and spending
limits 15 until the Supreme Court again addressed these regulations in 1976,
under First Amendment precedent, holding that spending limits were
unconstitutional when the money is spent to expressly advocate or oppose a
candidate. 16 It became apparent that FECA was falling short of its original
purpose when it was again amended in 1979 to allow corporations to
contribute unlimited amounts of “soft-money.” 17 Even with FECA in place, the
Buckley holding made clear that the Congress could only regulate the money
that was being directly given to candidates or was used to expressly advocate
for, or oppose, a federal candidate, leaving open the door for spending on
advertisements that fell short of express advocacy—using key terms like elect
or defeat—notably termed issue ads. 18 FECA amendments were also passed to
limit soft money spending by corporations through limiting PACs to one per
organization. 19
Following many years of litigation over loopholes in FECA, the Congress
attempted to preempt all unwanted involvement by passing the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold
Act, banning unlimited soft money contributions and restricting corporate
funding of issue ads within certain time periods of elections. 20 The Court
upheld the challenged portions of BCRA restrictions in McConnell v. FEC the
next year 21 which, on its face, seemed to imply the law would stand as is; but,
in 2007 the Court was again asked to review BCRA and this time it struck
down BCRA provisions restricting advertisements focusing on issues aired
shortly before elections paid for by corporations because “where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.” 22 Still at
this point, campaign finance jurisprudence banned corporate spending on
independent expenditures, but this was changed in 2010 when the Supreme
14

Id.
Id.
16 Id. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court upheld contribution limits, but struck down the
limit on independent expenditures which expressly advocated or opposed a candidate. Id.
17 Id.
18 Rowan, supra note 6.
19 Id.
20 Id. (showing that political issue ads were considered electioneering communications and equated to
independent expenditures made on express advocacy).
21 Id.
22 Id. (citing FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007)).
15
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Court again ruled on BCRA provisions, striking down, on First Amendment
grounds, the ban on corporate expenditures in federal elections. 23 The Court
held that “independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” 24 which in turn
brought about the death of campaign finance law. 25
Government Justification of Campaign Finance Law
When FECA was challenged in Buckley, the government justified the
regulation as an interest in preventing corruption as well as the appearance
thereof. 26 FECA was again challenged in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce; the valid government interest was extended to include a prevention
of distortion of the political speech marketplace by corporations with mass
wealth, thus validating an equality rationale. 27 After FECA was replaced by
BCRA, the valid government interest justifying regulations against soft money
was further expanded to include preventing the opportunity to influence
government actions under the prevention of corruption umbrella in McConell
v. FEC. 28 These many justifications were all upheld as valid government
interests for infringing on freedom of speech until the Court ruled in Citizens
United that the only valid government interest in regulating campaign finance
spending was to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof. 29 Because the
Court has held that the only interest the government may use when regulating
campaign finance is to prevent corruption, 30 and corporations cannot be
banned from making independent expenditures, 31 halting corporate
involvement in political spending must rely on another basis if there is a
continued fear surrounding the involvement of corporations in federal
elections.

23

Id.
Rowan, supra note 6. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)).
25 Michael Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VIRGINIA L. REV 1, 2 (March 2012).
26 Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 533, 561 (2010).
27 See id. at 562–63 (noting that corporate independent expenditures can influence elections, and the
corporate structure governed by the state can distort the electoral process).
28 See id. at 565.
29 See Kang, supra note 25, at 53.
30 Id.
31 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
24
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Fear of Corporate Participation in Federal Elections
The fear of corporate spending on federal elections stems from the idea that
allowing a corporation to use its deep pockets to influence elections would
cause a disproportionate influence, 32 but after Citizens United this interest is no
longer valid for governmental reliance when regulating campaign finance. 33
Because of lacking disclosure regulations for contributions, corporate spending
goes vastly unknown. 34 The fear that arises is that shareholders do not know
whether their money is being spent on elections, and if it is being spent, how
much of their money is used for political spending. 35 The Citizens United
holding, although allowing corporations to expend on speech, noted the
importance of transparent disclosures on this spending, 36 and because the
corporations who participate in political spending are not disclosing
contributions to organizations on the dark side of campaign finance, the fear of
corporate influence over federal elections has grown. 37 There are many who
believe transparency of disclosure in corporate political spending will bring
about greater trust in the system; 38 but, even when a corporation voluntarily
discloses political spending there may still be deception. One of the companies
that voluntarily agreed to be more transparent with its political spending,
Boeing, failed to report $200,000 in political contributions. 39 This shows that
even when a corporation vows to remain transparent, there is nothing looming
over its head as a punishment should it break its vow. Even the SEC has
acknowledged the fact that voluntary disclosures fall far short of giving enough
information relevant to ascertaining the amount of money a corporation has
truly spent on politics. 40 Today, corporations spend the most money of all
participants in the financing of campaigns and elections. 41 Because Citizens
32 See The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, supra note 1; see Saul Zipkin supra note 26 at
579–80.
33 See Kang, supra note 29.
34 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO.
L.J. 923, 925 (2013).
35 Id. at 925.
36 Charles Kolb, Corporate Political Spending: Show Me the Money!, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kolb/corporate-political-spend_b_8511218.html.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 Bebchuk, supra note 34, at 947.
40 Id. at 947–48.
41 Bruce F. Freed & Marian Currinder, Do Political Business in the Daylight: Corporations are
Distorting Our Democracy and the 2016 Election with Their Dark Money, US News (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:00 AM)
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016-04-06/corporate-money-is-playing-a-shadowy-role-in2016-politics.
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United ended most of the campaign finance jurisprudence, there is no clear
way to track the political spending of corporations on federal elections. 42 The
rise of 501(c)(4) corporations 43 and the emergence of super PACs 44 has
increased valid fears because of the increased anonymous spending and the
rate at how quickly these types of organizations may appear and disappear. 45 It
is argued that the massive influx in political spending can only be attributable
to corporations; the Washington Post reported that in the 2016 election, one out
of every eight dollars used by super PACs was attributable to corporations,
whether directly or indirectly. 46 Just as BCRA was passed to ban the soft
money left unaddressed by FECA, 47 the ruling from Citizens United requires a
legislative response to the striking down of BCRA provisions banning
corporate exclusion, and the response should be creating a system allowing for
a corporation to vote in elections only if it shows it can meet certain
requirements. If the fear stemming from a corporation spending political
money is so great, because the corporate voice is protected as speech under the
First Amendment, 48 the next logical step would be incentivizing the
corporation to abstain from spending political money to diminish that fear. The
incentive would need to provide an almost equally weighty opportunity to
influence elections in order to push corporations to buy into the system. After
establishing a baseline figure for the amount of influence a corporation may
have on an election, this variable would in turn be converted into an almost
equal amount of voting power so that the corporation may still exercise its
protected expressive rights without spending political money on elections.

42

See id.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012) (stating that these corporations are nonprofit organizations that operate
“for the promotion of social welfare.”).
44 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2012). Super PACs are 527 corporations that are organized “primarily for the
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt
function,” 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1); the relevant exempt function here is “influencing or attempting to influence
the election . . . of any individual to any Federal . . . office,” 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(2).
45 Freed & Currinder supra note 41.
46 Matea Gold & Anu Narayanswamy, How ‘Ghost Corporations’ are Funding the 2016 Election, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-ghost-corporations-arefunding-the-2016-election/2016/03/18/2446e526-ed14-11e5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-toptable-main_secretmoney837pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.d4fc2c27017f.
47 Robert Kelner & Raymond La Raja, McCain-Feingold’s Devastating Legacy, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Apr. 11, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mccain-feingolds-devastating-legacy/2014/04/11/
14a528e2-c18f-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html?utm_term=.e6891d46c8c9.
48 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
43
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Giving Corporations the Right to Vote
The Constitution does not grant to any person the right to vote. 49 In its
opinion in Minor v. Hapersett, the Supreme Court determined the right of
suffrage did not fall into the class of rights protected by the Constitution. 50 The
Court reasoned that regardless of a woman’s status as a citizen, failing to
confer upon her the right to vote did not abridge any of her privileges or
immunities within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment because suffrage
was without the clause. 51 This reasoning is further supported by the passage of
the Fifteenth Amendment, 52 noting that if the Fourteenth Amendment
considered voting as a privilege or immunity granted by the Constitution then
the Fifteenth Amendment would be superfluous. 53 Suffrage is protected as a
negative right, one that, if granted, will be protected as a privilege and
immunity. 54 This is shown by the passing of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870
when it was legislated the right to vote could not be withheld on the basis of
race or color, 55 then in 1920 with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment
which applied the same concept as the Fifteenth Amendment but for sex, 56 and
again in 1964 with the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
preventing the States from abridging the right to vote on the basis of wealth. 57
The electorate has been expanded by the Congress by constitutional
amendment other times as well, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment decreased the
minimum voting age to eighteen, 58 and the Twenty-Third Amendment granted
voting rights to the citizens of Washington D.C. 59
Constitutional amendments are not the only way to expand the voting class.
The electorate has been expanded through statute as well. 60 When Congress
grants citizenship, the Fifteenth Amendment protects the right to be free from

49

See Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874).
See id.
51 See id. at 171.
52 See id. at 175.
53 See id. at 175.
54 See id. at 176.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
57 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
60 See Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act, 30 Stat. L. 750, 751 (1943) (removing earlier restrictions on
Chinese immigrants becoming citizens, once they became citizens the Fifteenth Amendment protected voting
rights on the basis of race); see Indian Citizenship Act, 8 U.S.C. §12 (2012).
50
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voting restrictions based upon race. 61 All this legislation preventing voting
restrictions shows that Congress has the ability to restrict the reasons States
may prevent citizens from voting. Because Congress has authority to prevent
the States from withholding voting ability to certain groups, it should respond
to the Court’s Citizens United ruling by doing the same for corporations that
withhold from political spending. In the wake of the 2016 election, the
Electoral College continues to be scrutinized when it leads to the election of a
President who did not win a majority of the popular vote. It may again be time
to expand the electorate to increase the amount of possible voters, thus causing
the elected officials to be a more accurate reflection of the voices they are
elected to represent.
There appears to be but two ways in which a corporation may be granted
the right to vote. It is unlikely the Congress would pass legislation granting
United States citizenship to corporations, although corporations already
possess citizenship for purposes of lawsuits, 62 but Congress could propose an
amendment similar to the Fifteenth Amendment that the right to vote may not
be abridged on the account of corporate status, with a clause that allows it to
pass legislation in furtherance of the Amendment. Another option would be for
a corporation to attempt to register to vote in the State in which it is deemed a
citizen, be denied, and then challenge the denial in federal court with a hope
that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari in the case. The latter of these
two options seems more improbable than does the former, but assuming the
right to vote is given to corporations there would need to follow laws
governing the process in which a corporation may exercise this right.
Because Citizens United removed most of the restrictions on corporate
political spending, 63 any system created by Congress to remove corporate
money from politics would need to provide enough incentive to a corporation
to withhold from political spending. The Federal Election Commission (FEC),
created by FECA, 64 was given authority to promulgate rules and administer
advisory opinions in the scope of campaign finance law. 65 This means that
following a grant of voting rights to corporations, the FEC would need to
promulgate rules to govern corporate participation in elections.

61
62
63
64
65

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2012).
93 P.L. 443, 88, § 310 (a)(1) Stat. 1263.
93 P.L. 443, 88, § 311(a)(7)–(8) Stat. 1263.
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Framework of Corporate Voting
FEC rules on corporate voting should require a buy-in fee, as well as a size
classification for the corporations able to vote. In order to do this, the FEC
would need to ensure it both followed proper rulemaking procedures so the
rule was controlling on the corporations and was not arbitrary and capricious. 66
Agency action is reviewed under Chevron when determining whether to defer
to the agency’s decision. 67 Requiring a buy-in fee for corporations would be
justified by an interest in maintaining compliance with the requirements for
participation in the vote; the fee will be held similar to a bail-bond, and at the
conclusion of the election, so long as noncompliance is not discovered, it may
be returned. A corporation may challenge this regulation under the protections
of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibiting the abridgement of voting rights
due to failure to pay a tax, 68 but this would not be a tax on the right to vote
because under this system the corporation is not being forced to pay the fee;
the corporation would have the option to spend its money on political speech
instead of voting, and could either be returned in-kind at the conclusion of the
election or reflected as a tax deduction. The FEC would need to decide which
of these options would provide the best incentive to corporations to participate
in voting and withhold from political spending. The FEC should also restrict
the class of voters to C Corporations with a large number of employees. These
corporations pay an income tax, 69 and are generally larger than are other
business forms, 70 so the justification of restricting the vote to large
corporations would not be seen as arbitrary and capricious; further, requiring a
manifest size for corporate voting would prevent a wealthy person from
incorporating herself in order to increase her own voting strength.
The next question to address is a first generation voting rights assessment
of who would be responsible for casting the corporation’s vote. 71 Should the
shareholders get to decide where the votes go? The employees? Because the

66

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (2012).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2012). The Court granted cert. in this case to
determine the limits of Chevron deference, showing proper review of agency determinations is assessed under
Chevron. Id.
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
69 See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2012).
70 Roy Bahat, The Corporation is Dead, Long Live the Corporation, What’s the Future?, MEDIUM (Nov.
5, 2015), https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/the-corporation-is-dead-long-live-the-corporation-13b787e33b
29 (pointing out the growth of large US companies since the year 2000).
71 See Holder v. Hall 512 U.S. 874, 954 (1994) (Stevens J. concurring) (explaining that first generation
claims focus on access to the ballot).
67
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vote is being cast by the corporation, it must be cast by the group who will do
so in best interests of the corporation’s future. Here, the best system would be
to allow the Board of Directors to cast the votes of the corporation allowing for
shareholders and employees to voice opinions but not having the power to
control the vote, doing so would complicate the process. This should also
allow lawsuits to be brought by shareholders against the Board only when the
interests of the shareholders have been adversely affected and assessed under
the business judgement rule. 72
The second assessment is how much a corporate vote should count towards
an election. The one person one vote standard 73 should not apply here because
the corporation represents more than just one person; it is an aggregate of the
interests of the company, the shareholders, and similarly the employees. The
one person one vote standard would also fail to give incentive to the
corporation to withhold from spending on elections. To incentivize a
corporation to stop contributing to political spending, or expending on its own,
the apportioned votes would have to be sufficiently, equally weighty in
influence as would the money it is allowed to expend on federal elections after
Citizens United. To do this, a balance must be found between maintaining the
one person one vote standard, preventing a Board member from doubling her
own vote, and providing an incentive to push corporations to opt-out of
political spending.
A college of electoral votes should be created for corporate voters; this
would not only show for whom the corporations have support, shedding light
on where the unknown political spending would have gone, 74 but it would limit
the amount of influence corporations could have on federal elections. The
Electoral College was created by Article II of the United States Constitution as
a way of electing the President. 75 Its apportionment scheme is decided by the
total number of Senators and Representatives entitled to the State in
Congress. 76 A set number of electoral votes should be given to Corporate
America and divided among the participating corporations dependent upon
72 Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 521,
526 (2013) (“The business judgment rule ensures that decisions made by the directors in good faith are
protected even though, in retrospect, the decisions prove to be unsound or erroneous;” meaning the Board
would have to show the vote was cast reflecting business interest and not the personal interest of the Board
members.).
73 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
74 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 34 (stating corporate spending on elections is vastly unknown).
75 U.S. CONST. art. II.
76 Id.
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their relative size to each other, just as is done with the States in the Electoral
College. 77 In doing so, consideration would have to be given to the relative
influence of corporate political spending on federal elections weighed against
the fear of direct corporate influence on an election. Arguendo, allocating 212
electoral votes to corporations would bring the total number of electoral votes
from 538 78 to 750, implying that the new number to win the Presidency
increases from 270 79 to 375 electoral votes. This would give the corporations
influence over elections, but not enough influence to directly elect any
candidate. If this number were determined by the FEC, it would have to justify
this figure by showing 212 votes fell within the zone of ambiguity of the law to
receive deference on the rule. 80
The new law should also consider imposing a mandated winner-take-all
system 81 for the electoral votes to prevent vote splitting because that would
lead down a path toward a Board member simply doubling her own personal
vote. The system would also require separation from the Electoral College of
the states, meaning the electoral votes would not be added on to the votes of
any State; this would ensure the election could not be controlled by the states
with the most electoral votes that vote similarly in elections—California and
New York.
Protecting the Integrity of the System
Because the idea of granting corporations the right to vote is as
controversial as was granting corporations First Amendment rights, 82 there
would need to be a governing body to oversee compliance with the law, mostly
77 See id. (“[A] State’s electoral vote is equal to the entitled representation in Congress which is based
mostly upon population”).
78 What is the Electoral College? How it Works and Why it Matters, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 6,
2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/what-is-the-electoral-college_n_2078970.html.
79 Id.
80 See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“a reviewing court has no business rejecting an
agency’s . . . authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity. . . but is obliged to accept the agency’s
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.”).
81 What is the Electoral College? How it Works and Why it Matters, supra note 78 (stating that 48 states
use a winner take all system that gives all electoral votes of the State to the winner of the State’s popular vote;
Nebraska and Maine use a system that splits votes between the Senators, two votes, and the remaining
electoral votes are apportioned by congressional district).
82 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (granting corporations rights to political speech on First
Amendment grounds), and see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014) (granting companies the
protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and striking down the Health and Human
Services contraceptive mandate).
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that the corporations which opt-in to voting are not suppressing political
spending and double-dipping in campaign finance and voting. This law would
fall under FEC authority because FECA gave authority to the FEC for matters
of campaign finance law. 83 In order to be given the ability to vote, a
corporation would be required to submit, along with the buy-in fee, a petition
to the FEC showing it had not partaken in any political spending by disclosing
its financial records, and it was of a sufficient size by certification of company
population. When a petition is submitted to the FEC, the corporation will be
presumed to be involved in political spending and it must prove it has not. This
does not abridge the presumption of innocence granted by United States law, 84
because there is no punishment should the FEC find a corporation has
participated in political spending; even though the corporation would not be
allowed to vote, it would retain its ability to participate within the legal bounds
of campaign finance. Should the FEC, while reviewing a petition, find a
corporation has participated in political spending it would reject the petition
and void the buy-in fee. This would then allow the corporation to continue
spending on elections, just as it had been before petitioning for a vote.
The corporate voting system would require strict oversight from not only
the FEC, but from the corporation itself. Along with the forfeiture of the buy-in
fee, noncompliance after acceptance of the petition should be followed by
monetary penalties as well as suspension of the ability to petition the FEC for
the ability to vote in future elections. To ensure compliance, the law should
provide incentive to whistleblowers who report fraud in the certified financial
statement disclosed to the FEC, similar to provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010; 85 as well as provide employment protection to whistleblowers, similar to
the provisions within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 86
A foreseeable issue with enforcement is that the FEC has become rather
inefficient over the last decade or so. 87 It has not issued any new rules about
corporate money in the post-Citizens United world, 88 so it stands unclear what
the rules remain. This failure becomes more worrisome when considering a
lack of enforcement against a donor using a shell corporation to contribute
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See 93 P.L. 443, 88, § 311(a)(7)–(8) Stat. 1263.
See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (“the principle that there is a presumption of innocence in
the favor of the accused is the undoubted law.”).
85 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (b)(1) (2010).
86 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514(Sec. A)(a) (2012).
87 See generally Gold & Narayanswamy, supra note 46.
88 See id.
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money without being forced to disclose his own identity. 89 An ineffective FEC,
as we currently have, would not be able to prevent corporations from double
dipping, both spending political money and voting in the election. Before any
new rules are made concerning corporate money in politics it should be
established that the FEC is able to effectively function the way in which it is
needed for this system to work correctly; alternatively, another agency could
be created to provide oversight in this small area of the law in order to lower
FEC workload, and create a specialized division which could better understand
and evaluate petitions and investigate whether a corporation has fully abstained
from spending before it is granted the right to vote.
CONCLUSION
Passing a law allowing corporations to vote in return for exiting the market
of political spending would prevent corporations from avoiding disclosure by
funneling money through intermediaries, 90 bringing corporate involvement
into the light. This would result in a substantial decrease in the amount of
spending on federal elections because pushing corporations out of political
spending would in turn deprive intermediaries of receiving contributions from
significant donors. 91 In the post-Citizens United world of campaign finance,
because corporations are now able to participate in political spending, 92
Congress must make the next move in regulating the election process to protect
the integrity of, and the trust in, the United States’ election process. Granting
corporations the ability to participate in elections through voting would prevent
corporate dark money from influencing elections, resolve shareholder concerns
over whether their money is being spent on elections, and would mark the
return of the strict campaign finance system dismantled by Citizens United,
again pushing corporate money away from federal elections.
KYLE LANDRIGAN ∗
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91 See id. at 931 (stating that growth of funding to intermediaries over time leads to a presumption that
the money is coming from public companies).
92 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
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